Domestic Causes of Currency Crises: Policy Lessons for Crisis Avoidance by Reisen, Helmut
Domestic
Causes of
Currency
Crises
Policy Lessons for
Crisis Avoidance
Helmut Reisen
IDS Bulletin Vol 30 No 1 1999
120
1 Introduction
The 1990s have witnessed three distinct regional
currency crises: the Exchange Pate Mechanism
(ERM) crises of 1992-93, the Latin American crisis
of 1994-95, and now the Asian crisis of 1997?
Obviously, a major currency crisis every 24 months
is too much for policymakers' comfort. Exploring
the causes of these crises, both domestic and
international, should aim at making them less fre-
quent and less severe! Here, we will only succeed
if we avoid looking for 'causes' of currency crises in
the victim countries alone. We rather need an inte-
grated approach, based on realistic models of the
benefits and risks of international capital flows
between the rich and the developing countries.
The five countries most damaged by the ongoing
Asian crisis - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand - received net private
capital inflows worth 6.6 per cent of their com-
bined GDP over the period 1995-96. In the second
half of 1997, they suffered net outflows. The rever-
sal from 1996 to 1997 constituted a swing of 11
per cent of their combined GD? The biggest swing
came from commercial banks who had extended
loans well into 1997, despite earlier warnings on
overexposure from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) and the Institute of International
Finance (11F). There was also an important reversal
of net portfolio investment. The only capital-
account component that proved to be stable - just
as during Mexico's 1994-95 crisis - were foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows. The Thai baht and
the Korean won lost half of their value against the
dollar, the Indonesian rupiah fell by 80 per cent in
the first months of the crisis, fanning a strong rise
in non-performing loans in the local banking sys-
tem and wiping out net capital for unhedged cor-
porate borrowers. The reactive approach of the
sovereign rating industry intensified panic by
downgrading Asian borrowers to junk status. As
has been convincingly argued by Radelet and Sachs
(1998), among many others, the reversal in net
capital flows, exchange rates and sovereign ratings
in such a short period cannot be attributed to
changes in the affected countries' fundamentals.
The Achilles' heel of the global financial system
History suggests (Kindleberger f978) that financial
and currency crises will never be avoided altogether.
Table 1: Capital flows to Asian countries in crisis, % of GDP
Sources: IMP and Goldman Sachs
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
Annual averages
seems to be the herd behaviour among commercial
banks and portfolio investors (Wolf 1998; Wyplosz
1998). But for international financial investors to
panicas they did in Asiarequires weak fundamen-
tals in the affected countries in the first place. This
is what this paper will focus on.
One has to be extremely circumspect when writing
about 'domestic causes' of currency crises. All too
often, the isolated focus on characteristics which
have fallen victim to a currency crisis yields por-
trayed 'causes' that are merely endogenous effects of
massive net capital inflows. Current account
deficits, overvalued exchange rates (in real terms),
overinvestment in real estate and declining capital
productivity all figure prominently in the list of cul-
prits of Asia's crisis (see, e.g., Corsetti et al., 1998).
That view ignores, however, the endogeneity of
such variables. Flows from capital-rich to capital-
poor countries can only be effected with corre-
sponding external deficits of the recipient countries,
which are produced by a real appreciation of the
exchange rate. The appreciation in turn reduces the
relative incentive to invest in exportable production
and tilts incentives towards non-tradeables, includ-
ing real estate, whose relative price has to rise.
Higher capital equipment of labour, a result of
domestic investment financed by foreign savings,
reduces the marginal return to capital.
This article, instead, focusses on those countries with
excellent macroeconomic fundamentals that recently
turned from financial-market darlings to financial-
crisis victims within months: Chile 1982, Mexico
1994 and now the five Asian victims. It will be
argued that the 'root' cause for their currency crises
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resulted from the interaction of boom
'distortions', reinforced by exchange rate pegs that
effectively promised super dollar returns, with the
weakening of private-sector balance sheets as a result
of heavy inflows, disorderly financial liberalisation
and weak domestic financial infrastructures. The arti-
cle first provides a short survey on the currency-cri-
sis literature, then traces the process from boom to
financial vulnerability, and finally draws conclusions
for improving domestic financial systems (which
should become a privileged target for aid flows), for
exchange-rate policy and capital controls.
2 Domestic Indicators of
Emerging-Market Currency and
Banking Crises: A Capsule Survey
of the Literature
'A sad commentary on our understanding of what
drives capital flows is that every crisis spans a new
generation of economic models. When a new crisis
hits, it turns out that the previous generation of
models was hardly adequate' (Rodrik 1998, p.5).
The earliest models of currency crises, in particular
the influential paper by former International
Monetary Fund (IMF) chief economist Polak
(1957), were based on the incompatibility of expan-
sionary fiscal and monetary policies with fixed
exchange rates. Excessive money creation would
then 'leak out' through overall balance of payments
deficits, until the shortage of foreign exchange
reserves would force to devalue or to impose con-
trois on capital outflows. The attempts of investors
to anticipate the inevitable collapse would generate
a speculative attack on the currency when reserves
1989-94 1995-96 1997
Net private capital flows 4.3 6.6 0.2
- net direct investment 1.2 1.1 1.1
- net portfolio investment 0.9 1.5 0.6
- other net investment 2.2 4.1 0.3
Net official flows 0.3 0,0 1.1
Change in reserves 2.0 1.3 2.0
Table 2: 'Traditional' crisis indicators
fell to some critical level (Krugman 1979; Flood
and Garber 1984). These 'first-generation' crisis
models accounted well for the many currency crises
in the 1970s and also for the 1982 developing-
country debt crisis. But the models failed to explain
Chile's 1982 crisis, the 1992 ERM crisis, or the
Mexican peso crisis 1994-95.
Table 2 shows that the 'first-generation' crisis model
also fails to explain what happened in the five Asian
crisis economies. Government budgets were bal-
anced or moving into surplus (partly in appropriate
fiscal response to higher net private capital flows).
Growth in monetary aggregates was fairly high in all
crisis countries, but cannot be described as run-
away monetary expansion. Except in Thailand,
defined here as GDP growth divided by the inverse of the investment rate of the preceding year
Sources: Davies (1998), Corsetti et al., (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998)
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inflation rates were coming down, nominal GDP
growth was largely at levels corresponding to
money creation, and all countries were at a stage of
development where money demand was still
growing.
The logic of the 'second-generation' crisis model
(Obstfeld 1994) does not apply to the Asian crisis
either. This literature, developed in the aftermath of
the fiRM crisis, stresses the trade-offs between the
benefits of a credible exchange rate peg and the
costs in terms of higher interest rates, higher unem-
ployment or lower growth of defending the peg.
There was no such trade-off in the five Asian crisis
countries before the crisis erupted. Past and
expected growth was enviably high, interest rates
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1. Government budget, % of GDP
- average 1990-94 0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -1.4 3.2
- average 1995-96 1.7 0.1 0.8 0.4 2.6
2. M2, annual growth
- average 1990-94 19.4 18.0 21.4 20.6 16.7
- average 1995-96 27.2 15.7 20.9 23.7 14.8
3. Inflation rate, CPI
- average 1990-94 8.8 5.3 4.1 11.1 4.6
- average 1995-96 8.7 4.7 4.4 8.3 5.8
4. Change in official foreign reserves, % of GDP
(sterilised in parentheses)
- average 1990-94 1.8 (0.8) 0.9 (0.0) 6.2 (3.0) 1.8 (0.4) 3.4 (2.2)
- average 1995-96
b. Real exchange rate appreciation, accumulated %
2.0(1.0) 0.4(0.4) 1.3(0.0) 2.6(1.8) 0.6(0.0)
- 1990-94 8 9 14 38 11
- 1994-3/97 18 2 16 15 16
6. GDP growth p.a.
- average 198 7-96 6.9 8.3 8.5 3.7 9.5
- 81V consensus expectations (7/97) 7.8 6.3 7.6 n.a. 6.8
7. Current account, % of GDP
NIA definition
- average 1990-94
-2.7 -1.5 -7.4 -4.5 -7.5
- average 1995-96 -3.8 -3.4 -9.7 -5.5 -9.1
- difference -1.1 -1.9 -1.7 -1.0 -1.6
8. Efficiency
- average 1990-94 21.1 20.4 24.3 9.6 20.1
- average 1995-96 25.0 18.9 19.0 24.6 15.0
and sovereign yield spreads were going down not
up, and unemployment was informal (as usual in
developing countries). Traditional crisis models
cannot explain the Asian crisis.
Nor do conventional flow explanations, which rely
on current account sustainability or real overvalua-
tion problems, explain the Asian crisis well. To be
sure, there has been considerable appreciation of
real effective exchange rates, in particular during
the 1995-96 period. The effective appreciation
resulted largely from the rise in the US dollar to
which the Asian currencies were effectively pegged
and from the depreciation of the yen, a key com-
petitor currency The inappropriateness of a dollar
peg for the Asia Pacific Economic Community
(APEC) currencies had long been recognised
(Reisen and van Trotsenburg 1988), although it had
prevented beggar-thy-neighbour policies through
competitive devaluations in the region. But in no
way did the estimated overvaluation of the victim
currencies reach Latin American or East European
dimensions. On Goldman Sachs estimates (Davies
1998), the estimated overvaluation did not exceed
5 per cent by mid-1997; by early 1998 Asian cur-
rencies were undervalued by up to 70 per cent on
these estimates.
Current account deficits had been large in Malaysia
and Thailand. That did not imply, however, that they
were unsustainable in the sense of exploding total
foreign debt/GDP ratios above sustainable thresh-
olds (Reisen 1998). Moreover, cyclically adjusted
and corrected for underlying FDI cover, current
account inbalances were not held to be excessive in
the region, given the high past growth and expected
growth potential. Rather than a crisis due to con-
ventional current-account sustainability or real over-
valuation (flow) problems, the Asian crisis seems
primarily a capital-account crisis of stocks.
Broad aggregate efficiency numbers (as defined in
Table 2) also fail to support the notion that capital
flows reversed as investors perceived that they were
not invested efficiently While efficiency dropped
somewhat in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, that
drop may simply be explained by a decline in mar-
ginal productivity of capital, as high net capital
flows added to high domestic investment rates. In
the two (capital-) poorest sample countries,
Indonesia and the Philippines, capital efficiency
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actually rose during 1995-96 relative to the
1990-94 period.
As the speculative attacks of the 1990s, including
the Mexican peso crisis, challenged the view that
currency crises were due largely to the government's
inability to achieve monetary and fiscal discipline, a
number of researchers have turned to exploratory
empirical models in order to identify crisis predic-
tors. This literature points to indicators which are
more likely to be representative of the current Asian
crisis than the indicators emphasised by the tradi-
tional currency crisis literature:
In a panel of annual data for over 100 develop-
ing countries from 1971 through 1991, Frankel
and Rose (1996) find that a high ratio of FDI to
foreign debt inflows is associated with a low
likelihood of a currency crash. Note here that
this ratio deteriorated on average in the five cri-
sis countries from roughly 1:2 over 1989-94 to
1:4 over 1995-96 (Table 1). By contrast, Frankel
and Rose do not find evidence for the size of the
current account deficit to predict currency
crashes. It is interesting to recall that, from 1970
to 1982, Singapore ran a current account deficit
worth 12.1 per cent of GDP on average; almost
half of the corresponding net capital inflows
consisted of FDI.
Since the 1980s, the link between banking crises
and balance-of-payments crises has strength-
ened. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) trace 71
balance-of-payments crises and 25 banking
crises during the period 1970-95; while they
report only 3 banking crises vs. 25 balance-of-
payments crises during 1970-79, they find 22
banking crises vs. 46 payments crises over
1980-95. They find that financial liberalisation
(which occurred mostly since the 1980s) plays a
significant role in explaining the probability of a
banking crisis preceded by a private lending
boom. A banking crisis, they find, in turn helps
predict a currency crisis. The Kaminsky and
Reinhart findings are largely confirmed by
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) who identify
real exchange rates, bank loan growth (as an
indicator of bank fragility) and the ratio of coun-
try M2 to reserves (indicating reserve adequacy)
as significant crisis predictors. Banking crises, in
turn, have been identified to be preceded by low
growth, high real interest rates, high inflation,
Table 3: Indicators of financial vulnerability
deteriorating terms of trade, explicit deposit
insurance and by lax law enforcement
(Demirgûç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997).
It seems that the crisis prediction literature can
partially, but not fully, account for the Asian crisis.
It rightly points to the strong nexus between bank-
ing and currency crises. But low growth, high real
interest rates and high inflation can definitely not be
blamed for the Asian crisis. Table 3, by contrast,
shows clearly that currencies become vulnerable to
speculative attacks because of rising imbalances
between real cash balances, short-term debt and
official reserves. The importance of stock imbal-
ances for vulnerability to speculative attacks had
been driven home clearly already by the Mexican
crisis (Calvo and Mendoza 1996a). In Asia case, in
particular during 1995 and mid-1997, lending to
the private sector had clearly paced ahead of (fast)
GDP growth. The two countries which experienced
the highest net capital inflows -. Malaysia and
Thailand - also experienced the most rapid expan-
sion in the commercial bank sectors.
Abundant foreign supply of capital (offered at
rapidly falling sovereign yield spreads) and the
greater ability of Asian non-bank and bank
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borrowers to tap the international financial markets
interacted to fuel a rise in non-bank and bank for-
eign liabilities (toward BIS reporting banks). In
terms of foreign assets, non-bank foreign liabilities
exploded in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, while
bank foreign liabilities grew quickly in the
Philippines and again in Thailand during 1995 and
mid 1997.
Rapid bank and non-bank foreign borrowing finally
made Asian currencies vulnerable to attack. When
short-term foreign debt starts to exceed official
reserves (indicated by a ratio higher than one), each
creditor knows that there are not enough liquid for-
eign exchange reserves, so each rushes to the exit
door to be the first. Table 3 indicates that such a sit-
uation clearly held for Indonesia and Korea already
by mid-1994, and for Thailand thereafter. While
Malaysia and the Philippines displayed a short-term
debt/reserves ratio lower than one, they were finan-
cially open. Openness implies that M2/reserves
becomes the relevant indicator for financial vulner-
ability, as residents may try to obtain foreign cur-
rency for their domestic currency holdings. The
M2/reserves ratio exceeded one by far in all five cri-
sis countries, even though it had stopped growing
over 1995-96 except in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1. Lending to private sector, % of GDP
- end 1993 49 54 74 26 84
-end 1996 55 62 90 48
2. Foreign liabilities/foreign assets (towards BIS
reporting banks)
a. non banks
-end 1994 9.9 5.9 1.9 0.9 5.3
-mid 1997
b. banks
14.0 8.5 2.4 1.5 6.7
-end 1994 2.2 2.6 1.3 1.0 8.6
-mid 1997 2.8 2.7 1.8 2.6 12.4
3. Short-term foreign debt/reserves
-mid 1994 1.7 1.6 0.3 0.4 1.0
-mid 1997 1.7 2,1 0.6 0.8 1.5
4. M2/reserves
-end 1993 6.1 6.9 2.1 4.9 4.1
-end 1996 6.5 6.5 3.3 4.5 3.9
Sources: Corsetti et al. (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998)
3 From Boom to Financial
Vulnerability
In the new global-markets era with intense capital
mobility, yesterday's financial-market darlings,
including new OECD entrants, have repeatedly
become financial-crisis victims. I will argue here
that the 'root' cause for emerging-market currency
crises is the interaction of:
Boom 'distortions' with excessively optimistic
expectations by market participants, reinforced
by exchange rate pegs in the presence of sus-
tained interest differentials
The loosening of portfolio discipline in weak
domestic banking systems as a result of heavy cap-
ital inflows and disorderly financial liberalisation
This explanation seems to fit well the crises in Chile
1982, in Mexico 1994-1995 and the ongoing Asian
crisis. In all three cases, market-friendly economic
reform coupled with fiscal and monetary discipline
went along with effective dollar pegs and financial
liberalisation.
Chile, Mexico and the Southeast Asian countries
had been widely celebrated as models of economic
reform and high-growth performance before they
crashed. Asia was the centre of admiration and rosy
forecasts in the Asian Miracle Study by the World
Bank (1993) and in the New Global Age Study by
the OECD (1997). Governments in Europe incited
their firms and banks to take a larger claim in the
promising Asian economies. In fact, Southeast Asia
had not only been leading the world GDP growth
league, but such growth had also been more stable
than elsewhere in the developing world (Gavin and
Hausmann 1996). Asia deep ignorance of Latin
America's experience with currency crashes seemed
no cause for concern. Chile's and Mexico's experi-
ence with twin payment and banking crises had
originated in the explosive mix of domestic finan-
cial deregulation, implicit deposit insurance and
super returns for foreign investors as a result of dol-
lar pegs in the presence of sustained interest
differentials (Reisen 1997).
In Southeast Asia, as in Chile and Mexico before,
domestic financial reform, low levels of interna-
tional interest rates (in particular in Japan) and
excellent growth prospects contributed to a large
increase in the supply of loanable funds throughout
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the 1990s. Due to the existence of market and
policy failures, that mix can easily explode into (1)
overborrowing, (2) a banking crisis, and then (3) a
full-blown currency crisis:
(a) Private borrowers do not internalise the rising
marginal social cost of their private borrowing that
comes from the increasing vulnerability to specula-
tive attacks and the cost of fending these off (e.g. by
increasing foreign reserves accordingly). This is
known as the 'Harberger externality', already driven
home from Chile's 1982 crisis (Harberger 1985).
b) Excessively optimistic expectations about
'permanent' income levels (e.g. after major changes
in the policy regime, or new membership in a First
World club) lead to overborrowing, because finan-
cial market institutions fail as efficient information
conduits between depositors and borrowers
(McKinnon and Pill 1996). Financial market bub-
bles add to such boom mentality through the
wealth effect on current income. Firms with a high
riskreturn profile have an incentive to borrow and
invest heavily, as their exposure is limited by bank-
ruptcy laws or implicit guarantees (this is the focus
of Krugman 1998, but the theory is not new).
Likewise, when the government insures deposit
against adverse outcomes, it reduces incentives to
ration credit and reduce credit risk. This results in
higher bank lending, which in turn can underpin
excessively optimistic expectations about future
growth prospects.
(e) Exchange rate pegs, in combination with
sustained interest rate differentials (on which more
below), tend to reinforce bank lending and spend-
ing booms. They constitute an incentive for offshore
borrowing by creditworthy banks and non-banks as
well as for foreign lenders. Central bank interven-
tion on the foreign exchange market, to peg the cur-
rency in view of net inflows, unless sterilised fully,
is intermediated into the banking system. The
exchange rate peg provides the incentive to allocate
those funds disregarding currency and maturity
risks, as these are being implicitly transferred to the
central bank (Calvo and Mendoza 1996b). Such
incentives for currency and maturity mismatches
may have been reinforced in Asia by its experience
of sustained and stable growth. Catch-up growth
should result in real exchange-rate appreciation
(through the BalassaSamuelson effect), explaining
why short-term liabilities were foreign-currency
denominated, unhedged. As growth went along
with a high degree of stability, maturity mismatches
(short-term debt for long-term investment) were
ignored as well.
(d) The persistence of high interest rate differentials
after and despite financial opening can in theory be
explained by sovereign risk premia, currency deval-
uation risk, inflation inertia or by structural deter-
minants. However, bond-yield spreads and
syndicated loan-rate spreads for Southeast Asia fell
well into mid 1997 (Cline and Barnes 1997).
Sovereign ratings by the leading rating agencies did
not signal increased sovereign risk until after the
crisis erupted (Reisen 1998). With regard to
exchange rates, the market failed to anticipate the
extent to which currencies would depreciate, even
once the crisis began (Radelet and Sachs 1998).
And high real interest rates could hardly reflect
inflation inertia (as it often had done in Latin
America), because inflation had been fairly low for
years, except in the Philippines perhaps. This leaves
us with microeconomic explanations of deviation
from interest parity and persistently high domestic
lending rates, just like those experienced by the
Southern Cone countries in Latin America 15 years
earlier (Fischer and Reisen 1993). The major
structural determinants there were:
the persistence of segmented credit markets,
where creditworthy borrowers could tap global
financial markets at low borrowing cost, while
smaller and service-sector firms stayed confined
to expensive domestic credit, with a correspond-
ing concentration of bank loan portfolios
the existence of economic conglomerates (Chile's
grupos, for example), with a group of firms
organised around one or more domestic banks,
resulting in weak portfolio discipline and over-
exposure by the conglomerate banks
non-performing loans and distress borrowing, as
banks capitalise debt service on bad loans and
increase interest charges on healthy borrowers,
in order to avoid explicit bankruptcies of impor-
tant borrowers that could result in a major bank
run by depositors
restricted entry into the banking sector, in
particular for foreign banks, resulting in oligop-
olistic structures and correspondingly large
interest rate margins
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In a financially closed economy, the market and
policy failures presented above are reflected in
higher financial yields, but their effect on quantities
- borrowing and spending - is ambiguous, depend-
ing on offsetting income and substitution effects
(McKinnon and Pill 1996). In an open economy, by
contrast, the boom distortion leads to excessive
spending (consumption or investment), financed
by excessive borrowing from the rest of the world.
The McKinnon-Pill solution to the distortion is sim-
ilar to a Pigou-Harberger tax, a reserve requirement
on foreign deposits.
From a macroeconomic perspective alone, up to
1994 it was difficult to 'read' that Asia was heading
for trouble. This is nicely shown by the IMF
Occasional Paper No. 122 (Kahn and Reinhart
1995) where the almost prophetic warnings by
Folkerts-Landau and co-authors about the deterio-
rating credit quality and rising financial risks in the
AVEC countries were preceded (and to a certain
extent discounted) by the macroeconomic analysis
of Khan and Reinhart, who concluded:
The above discussion has highlighted that the
risks associated with capital inflows create pol-
icy dilemmas. However, the overall picture is
much more positive, as many Asian countries
and a smaller number of Latin American coun-
tries have used these inflows to finance produc-
tive investment [sic!] and achieve higher growth
. to limit some of the risks associated with
short-term flows, a reasonable sequencing of
policies would consist in initially limiting the
intermediation of those flows through sterilised
intervention, greater exchange rate flexibility,
and/or increased marginal reserve require-
ments, followed by a gradual monetization of
these flows (that is, nonsterilized intervention),
accompanied perhaps by an appreciation of the
currency (p.29).
In fact, my own analysis largely concurred (Reisen
1996) as there was fiscal restraint to costrain appre-
ciation pressures, considerable sterilisation of
inflows and/or reserve requirements on foreign-cur-
rency deposits, no signs of CPI-adjusted real cur-
rency overvaluation, higher investment rates (rather
than consumption) resulting from net inflows and a
variety of capital inflow controls in the Asian crisis
countries, Only from 1995 did real exchange rate
misalignment develop as the dollar started to rise
relative to the yen, while the terms of trade (for
semiconductors, etc.) deteriorated. And only from
1995, did Asian domestic lending rates start to rise
(after converging towards international levels
before) and short-term borrowing become the dom-
inant feature in Asian capital accounts. To be sure,
most analysts had failed to perceive the extent to
which portfolio discipline in the weak domestic
financial systems had deteriorated as a result of
heavy capital inflows and disorderly financial
liberalisation.
The failure of Southeast Asia to adjust in a timely
manner to changing external conditions and to
domestic overheating was also rooted in the weak
bank and non-bank balance sheets that had devel-
oped over the early 1990s. Currency devaluation
would have drastically reduced the net worth of
banks and non-banks as their foreign-currency lia-
bilities were a multiple of foreign-currency assets
already by end 1994, except in the Philippines
(recall Table 3). Increases in interest rates, and
related declines in asset values that were heavily
used as collateral for domestic lending, would have
promoted a banking and financial crisis. As higher
interest rates tend to intensify adverse selection
problems in developing countries (Mïshkin 1996),
they lead to a steep decline in domestic lending,
investment and aggregate activity. Governments in
Asia's crisis countries were not (yet) prepared to face
these problems head on, and global financial mar-
kets were happy to provide enough money to delay
the day of reckoning. A precise replay of Mexico
(Calvo and Mendoza 1996a).
Financial opening throughout Asia had encouraged
short-term capital inflows, even if they were at
times restricted:
In Thailand, the authorities approved the
establishment of the Bangkok International
Banking Facility (BIBF) 'which greatly eased
access to foreign financing and expanded short-
term inflows' (Johnston et aI. 1997). In 1995,
the Provincial International Banking Facility was
established which could extend credit in both
baht and foreign currencies with funding from
overseas.
In Korea, the 1994-97 surge in short-term
inflows can be attributed to acceleration in
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financial liberalisation by allowing domestic
financial institutions greater freedom in asset
and liability management, in particular in bor-
rowing from international financial markets
(Park 1998).
Indonesia relaxed over the 1 990s foreign bor-
rowing for trade finance by private entities,
including sales of securities to non-residents and
liberalisation of FDI and portfolio investment
through the stock markets (Johnston et al.
1997). On the other hand, the authorities reim-
posed in 1991 quantitative controls on offshore
borrowing by banks and state enterprises.
In mid-1994 Malaysia lifted reserve require-
ments on foreign financial institutions' accounts
in Malaysian banks as well as a ban on issues of
short-term securitïes to non-residents (Folkerts-
Landau et al. 1995).
Concerns that financial opening in developing
countries would run ahead of the financial infra-
structure required to constrain financial risks have
been voiced permanently since Chile's 1982 crisis
(see, e.g., Edwards 1990; McKinnon 1991; Fischer
and Reisen 1993). In the context of Asia's crisis
countries, early warnings by IMP and World Bank
staff were clear enough:
The AVEC developing countries face the policy
challenge of building a supervisory and regula-
tory infrastructure that (1) ensures the efficient
allocation of bank credit, and (2) safeguards the
integrity and stability of capital markets.
Although many of these countries have made
great strides in liberalizing and strengthening
their financial systems in recent years, much
remains to be done. . . . In many countries,
banking problems have most often been the
result of bad credit decisions and inept man-
agement of credit risk, including overexposure
to certain types of risk, and have caused major
losses. Large and relatively volatile capital flows
can contribute to these problems, especially
when bank balance sheets are badly structured,
by causing large swings in bank liquidity that
result in alternating periods of credit expansion
and contraction. Two major areas of concern are
the ability of the banking systems to assess,
price and manage risk, and the adequacy of the
supervisory frameworks to prevent and contain
systemic risk, particularly in the presence of
Table 4: Bank system risk exposure and financial infrastructure
Sources: Folkers-Landau et al. (1995), johnston et al. (1997), Corsetti et al. (1998)
safety nets and the problem of moral hazard.
(Folkerts-Landau et al. 1995, p.32.)
Liberalization is inexpensive, fast and easy to
implement; building institutional capacity is
expensive, slow and complex. Thus many
countries have done the quick and easy reforms
first. However justified this sequence maybe on
political grounds, and even though it increases
demand for a better infrastructure for finance, it
undermines the stability of the financial system.
(Claessens and Glaessner 1997.)
The only aspect which was underemphasised in
these prophetic warnings was the lack of corporate
governance in the Asian crisis economies. More
concerned with raising market share than with
maximising profits, and reluctant to issue equities
as this would dilute their management control,
non-bank firms greatly contributed to overborrow-
ing by raising offshore short-term debt. As shown in
Table 3, this problem was particularly visible in
Indonesia and Korea. As, in addition, commercial
banks imported substantial amounts of capital
(rather than merely intermediating capital inflows),
the heavy capital inflows contributed less to
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monetary-aggregate imbalances (M2/reserves) as
emphasised by Calvo and Mendoza (1996b), but to
increasing bank and non-bank debt imbalances.
Nevertheless, the domestic financial systems con-
tributed heavily to weak balance sheets and finan-
cial vulnerability in Asia, not just through the
excessive quantity, but also through the low quality
of foreign capital intermediation. Table 4 represents
the extent of risk exposure in the Asian bank sys-
tems at the outbreak of the crisis. Non-performing
loans were the highest in 1997 in Korea (16 per
cent of total assets), Thailand (15 per cent) and
Indonesia (11 per cent); they are expected to
increase sharply over 1998. This compares to a
non-performing loan ratio of 9.3 per cent in Mexico
early 1995, where the cost of rescuing banks has
been estimated at ca. 15 per cent of GDP on a net
present-value basis (Caprio and Klingebeil 1996).
As the banks, with the exception of the Philippines
and possibly Malaysia, were severely undercapi-
talised in the Asian crisis countries (with capital-to-
asset ratios estimated at 6-10 per cent), the
non-performing loans had on average already
wiped out the total capital of banks in Korea,
Thailand and Indonesia.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1. Bank system exposure to risk, % of assets end
1997
- non-performing loans 11 16 8 6 15
- capital ratio 8-10 6-10 8-14 15-18 6-10
- real estate exposure 25-30 15-25 30-40 15-20 30-40
- collateral valuation 80-100 80-100 80-100 70-80 80-100
2. Regulatory features during the 1990s
- bank lending to connected firms high high
- government-directed bank lending yes yes yes yes yes
- bank deposit insurance
- importance of state-owned banks
none
high
none none yes
high
none
- accounting standards weak weak weak weak
- enforcement of existing regulations weak weak weak weak weak
3. Incentives for capital flows
- short-term inflows limited limited promoted
(promoted)
- long-term inflows limited limited promoted
- outflows free limited limited
As before in Latin America (see Ffrench-Davis and
Reisen 1998), excessive real estate exposure has
been a prominent feature of the lending and spend-
ing boom in Asia as well. Real estate exposure is
estimated at 30-40 per cent in Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand, while it is somewhat lower in the
Philippines and in Korea (where the bad loans are
concentrated with the chaebois). The high real
estate exposure of Asian banks indicates to what
extent loans were used not to finance productive
investment, but speculative demand of existing
assets in fixed supply Thus, part of the foreign
inflows went into feeding speculative asset price
bubbles. The excessive real estate exposure was
clearly related to excessive collateral valuations; the
Philippines, which had the lowest real estate expo-
sure, also had the lowest collateral valuation (Table
4). As the asset bubble burst, the deflating values of
real estate and other assets, reducing the value of
loan collateral, clearly determined the extent of the
non-performing loans.
In Indonesia and Korea, as in Chile in the early
1980s, balance sheet weakness in the banking sys-
tem was also related to credit exposures to borrow-
ers connected to the lending bank (Folkerts-Landau
et al. 1995). Although there were regulatory restric-
tions on bank ownership, they did not prevent
banks from becoming controlled by non-bank
firms. In Korea, where the use of dummy accounts
was widespread, this prevented the enforcement of
restrictions against concentrations of lending to the
bank shareholders.
Loosening portfolio discipline and debt imbalances
which were fuelled by heavy inflows can partly be
traced to government intervention in bank lending
and corporate finance. Folkerts-Landau et al.
(1995) point to the fact that many APEC develop-
ing countries, in fact all five crisis victims, have reg-
ulatory requirements to allocate fixed proportions
of bank loan portfolios to particular sectors (see
Table 4). As mandated loans carry an implicit bail-
out guarantee and as they are usually refinanced by
the central bank at below-market interest rates,
banks have little incentive to limit their credit risk.
The pursuit of growing market shares has led to a
neglect of the cost of capital, in particular where
government allocation of credit played an impor-
tant role for industrial policy 'Picking the winners'
may be fairly easy during the very early stages of
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development, and even then it invites moral hazard
and rent-seeking behaviour (Vittas and Wang
1991). Once countries have moved up the global
product cycle, the chances that government-led
credit allocation leads to capital waste increase dis-
proportionately As problem loans develop as a
result of mandated lending, the implicit guarantees
given by governments to the banks often obviate
the need to identify such problem loans properly
and to build reserves against them.
As already emphasised by the IMP in 1995 (again,
Folkerts-Landau et al.) 'many of the APEC develop-
ing countries . . . are not well equipped to manage
the increased risks inherent in intermediating
volatile capital flows and to absorb high asset price
volatility' (p.39). The report then points to incen-
tive problems that anse from existing deposit insur-
ance in the Philippines and from the high
importance of state-owned banks in Indonesia as
well, where a bail-out presumption can be assumed
to play a particularly important role.
Even more endemic, it seems, are the poor
accounting standards and limited disclosure
requirements in the emerging markets (for Latin
America, see Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1996).
Inconsistent financial reporting, the limited power
of auditors (or tax collectors) to examine company
records, the lack of sanctions for incorrect reporting
of information, the use of borrowed names and the
maintenance of multiple accounts greatly diminish
the reliability of reported information. Poor
accounting standards imply that even detailed
examination by supervisors and regulators may not
reveal much information.
Another endemic shortcoming in most emerging
markets is the lack of enforcement of existing regu-
lations. In fact, the Asian crisis countries had tried
to strengthen the supervisory and regulatory infra-
structure during the 1980s and 1990s, partly in
response to costly banking crises (such as in
Indonesia and Malaysia) a decade ago (see Fischer
and Reisen 1993, for details). Bank regulators had
imposed limits on bank lending, including liquidity
requirements and exposure limits. Moreover, the
countries now in crisis introduced risk-based capi-
tal requirements (note, however, that foreign
exchange exposure was missing from the Basle
accords on these requirements).
However, capital requirements are ineffective as
long as accounting standards are ineffective.
Inaccurate reporting on non-performing loans, with
interest rate recorded as accrued for bad loans
rolled over, or unclear definitions of what can be
included in capital, will show up in high capital-
adequacy ratios but disguise the extent of non-per-
forming loans, Fictitious names in bank accounts
make it impossible to enforce restrictions on over-
exposure by banks to individual or corporate coun-
terparts.
4 Conclusions for Reducing the
Frequency and Severity of
Currency Crises
Private spending booms, fuelled by overborrowing,
have increasingly led to twin banking and currency
crises in developing countries, which were
acclaimed as star performers until the crises
erupted. Private capital inflows, attracted by finan-
cial opening and by exchange rate pegs, have
repeatedly reinforced such pre-crisis booms.
Domestic financial systems have tended to prove
too weak as a conduit for heavy capital inflows,
resulting in declining credit quality and financial
fragility As long as herding behaviour remains a
prominent feature of global capital markets, devel-
oping countries with strong macroeconomic funda-
mentals are advised to pay close attention to
indicators of financial vulnerability, in particular to
short-term debt/reserve levels as well as to currency
and maturity mismatches. To avoid a rise of these
indicators above critical threshold levels, several
avenues can be pursued.
Some of these avenues are uncontroversial, but
deceptively hard to implement, in particular in the
context of developing countries' political, institu-
tional and legal backgrounds.
Good accounting standards and complete,
accurate and timely information disclosure are a
necessary precondition for prudential regulation
and supervision. Moreover, they can stabilise
market expectations. This, however, requires
two things, both pointed out by Rivlin (1998):
'In actual fact a great deal of information usually
turns out to have been available which no one
ever looked at or effectively analyzed. For trans-
parency to be useful, people need to actually
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want to look - and too often those who are
making high profits would rather not hear bad
news.' And: 'A culture of transparency and
timely, accurate information . . . can restrain the
boom by enabling investors to assess risk more
accurately, and it can cushion overreaction once
a downward slide begins. But such a culture can-
not be built quickly, and even where it exists, has
to be assiduously maintained.'
Only with reliable accounting systems and dis-
closure requirements to ensure transparency will
it be possible to strengthen bank and non-bank
balance sheets and to enforce prudential regula-
tion through serious, independent supervisory
arrangements. But it is safe to assume that basic
ingredients for effective enforcement of pruden-
tial regulation will meet resistance from affected
interest groups. Still, the basic requirements are:
independent internal oversight of lending deci-
sions by a credit review committee; vesting the
supervisory agency with the authority to exam-
ine bank operations and balance sheets, close
banks and establish entry criteria, define capital
adequacy and exposure limits, enforce asset clas-
sification, provisioning rules and prudent collat-
eral valuation that fully reflects the volatility of
developing-country asset markets. To be sure,
the 'wish list' is long, and has been lengthening
(Goldstein and Turner 1996).
These largely uncontroversial prescriptions, actively
promoted since Mexico's crisis by the GlO Working
Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Market
Economies (with the participation of several Asian
crisis countries), will take years or decades to
implement and will be hard to maintain. Quick
fixes will not do the job. Progress with respect to
information disclosure and strengthened public and
private-sector balance sheets should determine to
what extent countries can diversify the sources of
capital inflows with added net benefit. First princi-
ples are the most reliable guide here, whatever the
pressure from money managers.
According to the debt-cycle hypothesis, rarely
validated empirically, external savings raise domes-
tic investment and growth, which in turn stimulates
savings that eventually contribute to the elimination
of net foreign debt. Such a virtuous circle hides five
requirements, again rarely complied with in
practice (Deviin et al. 1994):
First, external capital flows should consistently
augment investment, rather than be diverted to
consumption
Second, the investment must be efficient
Third, the country must invest in tradeables (or
trade-related infrastructure) to create a trade sur-
plus that will accommodate the subsequent
switch in transfers required to service the debt
Fourth, an aggressive domestic savings effort is
called for, with the marginal savings rate exceed-
ing the average savings rate
Fifth, the virtuous circle requires capital
exporters willing to provide stable and pre-
dictable flows at terms in line with the recipient
country's factor productivity
These demanding requirements seem best fulfilled
by FDI flows (Reisen 1997). First, FDI is by long-
term profitability expectations, it is less dependent
on financial market sentiment than debt or portfo-
lio equity flows. Second, in a largely undistorted
real economy, FDI improves the host country's pro-
duction function and produces positive external
spillovers, comparable to agglomeration benefits.
Thus, the Harberger externality does not apply to
FDI.
At the other extreme, short-term debt-creating
flows may have a positive role for consumption
smoothing in theory (although they tend to be
excessive in boom times and unavailable when a
country is in a bust situation). Their contribution to
growth, however, is dubious at best; that holds, in
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particular when short-term debt adds to high
domestic savings so that marginal capital returns
can be presumed to be declining fairly fast. On the
other hand, short-term debt adds clearly to finan-
cial vulnerability To avoid speculative attacks, and
when the short-term debt/reserves ratio danger-
ously approaches 1, this implies the need to put
every dollar of increased foreign debt into official
reserves to prevent the vulnerability ratio from
growing. This implies borrowing at a higher rate of
interest than, say, the rate for reinvesting it into US
Treasury bills. The net benefit of such a swap would
be clearly negative to the country
How to influence the structure of capital inflows,
then, towards long-term equity? The Latin
American experience, in particular more recently,
shows that two mutually reinforcing policies can do
the trick (Ffrench-Davis and Reisen 1998). First,
keep nominal exchange rates flexible enough, and
even introduce noise through central bank inter-
vention if they are on a too stable appreciating
trend. Managed flexibility raises the currency risk
for short-term investors chasing high local returns.
Second, discourage excessive inflows by an implicit
tax that varies inversely with maturity There is
strong evidence that policy management can impact
strongly on the composition and also overall size of
flows. This is important because reducing the size
of flows will contain real appreciation and the rela-
tive decline in the profitability of tradeables. Biasing
the composition of flows towards FDI will stimulate
the investment response and reduce volatility
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